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Unionization imposes substantial costs on employers. This paper develops a model that
recognizes that, as a result, employers will set wages and employment taking into account the
effect of their decisions on workers’ incentives to organize. This model of employer behavior
allows us to address two questions jointly: What determines which firms become unionized?
And what are the consequences of unionization for employment and wages in nonunion firms?
The implications of the model depart significantly from those of previous work, which either
ignored employers’ strategic behavior, or treated these questions in isolation. JEL: J23, J31,
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I Introduction
Unionization is very costly to employers. Despite the dramatic decline in the rate of union
membership in the U.S. over the past twenty years, the wage premium that unions guarantee
their members is substantial – between 15 and 25 percent – and has not shown any significant
downward trend (see Figure 11). Therefore, unless unionization has a large positive effect on
productivity, firms have powerful incentives to remain nonunion. As has been well documented,
if employers perceive any risk of unionization, they adjust their wage and employment policies
to make joining a union less attractive to workers (Rees and Schultz (1970), Foulkes (1980)),
and, if that fails, resist union organization strongly, even if this frequently involves taking legally
questionable actions (Freeman (1986), Freeman and Kleiner (1990)).2
Figure 1: Union-nonunion Wage Gap and Union Density among Private Sector Nonagricultural
Workers. 1973-1998. (Source: Hirsch and Schumacher (2000))
Thus when faced with potential unionization, employers take into account the effect of their
decisions on workers’ incentives to unionize. This means that, on the one hand, employers’
1Figure 1 plots union density and the union wage gap for private sector, nonagricultural workers in the U.S.
for the period 1973-1981,1983-1998. The wage differentials are calculated in Hirsch and Schumacher (2000) from
CPS data, excluding workers with earnings imputed by the Census. See Hirsch and Schumacher (2000) for a
discussion of the dataset, the controls used in the wage equations, and the reasons to exclude allocated earners.
2In 1994, the ratio of unfair labor practice complaints issued by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
to the number of union recognition elections was 0.843 (Ehrenberg and Smith (1997), p. 493). See also Flanagan
(1989).
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wage and employment choices under the threat of unionization will differ from those they
would make in the absence of such threat, and that, on the other hand, unionization cannot
be analyzed independently of wage determination. The contribution of this paper is to develop
a model in which nonunion employers behave strategically, and in which wages, employment,
and the incidence of unionization are simultaneously determined. The model shows that, once
we account for this simultaneity, we obtain predictions both about the effects of the threat of
collective bargaining on employment and wages, and about the determinants of unionization
that depart significantly from the received wisdom.
There are two main views as to the effect of unions on the wages and employment of
nonunion workers.3 According to the first of these views (the crowding or spillover view), the
nonunion sector behaves competitively, and therefore the impact of unionization on the wages
and employment of nonunion workers takes place solely through its effect on the supply of labor
to the nonunion sector. If, as commonly assumed, collective bargaining reduces employment in
the union sector, it follows that unionization lowers wages in the nonunion sector, as the latter
absorbs the displaced workers.
The union threat view, in contrast, holds that nonunion employers raise wages to forestall
unionization (Rosen (1969)), and, as a consequence cut employment as they move up their labor
demand curves. Since wages are prevented from falling by the union threat, the labor market
does not clear, and unemployment ensues.
With respect to the determinants of the incidence of unionization, it is often argued that
those firms where the expected wage gains from unionization are larger are more likely to become
unionized. In turn, these wage gains are expected to be larger in those firms earning higher
rents, so unionization should be more likely in more profitable firms (see, for example, Hirsch
(1991), p. 60). To the extent that changes in estimated union wage premia reflect changes in
the expected wage gains from unionization, union membership and the union wage premium
should be positively correlated. This argument has led some researchers (e.g. Blanchflower
(1997)) to consider it a puzzle that despite the precipitous decline in U.S. (and British) union
density in the last two decades, union wage premia have remained unaltered. One proposed
explanation for this apparent puzzle has been that the high union wage differentials of the late
1970s were precisely the cause of the decline in union density: High wage differentials would
have led employers to resist organization more strongly, a change recorded by the increase in
the number of unfair labor practice complaints.4 However, this story does not explain what
prompted the initial shift to higher wage differentials, and why, after the long decline in union
density, wage differentials have remained high rather than return to their initial values. (Again,
see Figure 1.) The absence of a model that simultaneously explains wage determination and
unionization (the only exception being Lazear (1983)) means that there is no theoretical account
3See Ehrenberg and Smith (1997) for a standard textbook exposition of these two views.
4See Freeman and Medoff (1984), Freeman (1986), Freeman and Kleiner (1990), Blanchflower and Freeman
(1992), Blanchflower (1997).
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of these trends.
Whether more profitable firms are more likely to become organized is an interesting ques-
tion in its own right, but it may be even more relevant because of its consequences for the
estimation of the effects of unionization. One of the main problems in the empirical literature
examining the effects of unions is that unionization is likely to be correlated with unobservable
firm characteristics that also influence the variable of interest (be it profits, wages, etc.). For
example, suppose that we were interested in estimating the effect of unionization on profits, and
unionization was more likely to occur in more profitable firms. Then, unless we can perfectly
control for expected profitability, OLS estimates of the union effect on profits would tend to
be downward-biased, that is, they would show a smaller –in absolute value– negative effect.
Similarly, estimates of the union wage premium would tend to overestimate the true effect of
unions on compensation.
In contrast to these views, the model in this paper shows that: (1) The threat of unionization
induces nonunion employers to increase their wages above competitive levels, but does not
generally reduce employment as a consequence. (2) Only the presence of asymmetric information
about firm profitability may lead worse performing firms to reduce employment to convince
workers that they cannot expect high wage gains if they organize. (3) Firms earning lower
rents are more likely to become unionized. (4) Negative industry shocks make unionization
more likely. (5) Conventional estimates of the effect of unions on profits will be upward biased,
while estimates of the union wage premium may be downward biased. (6) In equilibrium, union
membership and the union wage premium will tend to be negatively correlated.
These predictions follow from the recognition that employers will behave strategically when
faced with the threat of unionization. Employers can ensure that unionization does not take
place if they pay wages at least as high as those workers would obtain if they organized. As long
as the process of organization entails some costs to workers or unionization reduces rents, it will
be optimal for employers to pay workers more than their alternative wage so as to match their
expected utility from unionization, and thus avoid unionization altogether. This would make
union organization possible only in those firms where unions improved productive efficiency,
or provided benefits to workers that employers could not offer themselves. If we allow that
employers may be better informed than workers about their firms’ prospects, unionization can
take place in equilibrium, even if it does not have any positive effect on efficiency. If workers do
not know with certainty what they would obtain if they organized, their expectations will be
too optimistic in those firms with less than average profitability. These firms may thus find it
too costly to prevent unionization, and may allow union formation in order to signal their low
profitability to workers.
The increase in wages required to prevent unionization, however, does not reduce employ-
ment, as predicted by the standard union threat view. By increasing employment, the firm
reduces the wage it needs to pay to dissuade workers from unionizing, because a higher em-
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ployment level is likely to decrease both the negotiated union wage, and workers’ probability of
employment after organization. The marginal cost of labor is thus lower than the wage, and falls
as employment increases. This strategic motive to increase employment more than compensates
for the rise in wage costs, so that no reduction in employment takes place despite the higher
wages. However, if firms have private information about their profitability, less profitable firms
may find it optimal to employ fewer workers to distinguish themselves from profitable firms, for
which the reduction in employment would be more costly. Less profitable firms would thus lay
off workers to convince the remaining ones to moderate their wage demands.
While there exists a large empirical literature that attempts to measure the effects of unions
on wages and firm performance,5 the theoretical work on the determinants of unionization and
its effects on the behavior of nonunion firms is surprisingly scarce. In a seminal contribution,
Sherwin Rosen (1969) first introduced a simple reduced-form model of wage determination
in which nonunion firms take into account the effect of their wage choice on the probability
of unionization. William Dickens (1986) followed on Rosen’s contribution, and developed a
formal model of wage and employment determination in the presence of a unionization threat.
Using a cooperative game theory approach, Dickens described the wage and employment policy
that would avoid unionization at a minimum cost, and was the first (and last, to the best of my
knowledge) to raise the possibility that the cost-minimizing choice may involve overemployment.
Unfortunately, Dickens did not ask whether, or under which circumstances, it may be optimal to
let workers form a union, and therefore his model cannot provide predictions about unionization.
The papers by Freeman (1986), Freeman and Kleiner (1990), Blanchflower and Freeman (1992),
and Blanchflower (1997) mentioned above have tried to explain the extent of unionization as a
function of the expected wage gains from collective bargaining.6 In these papers, expected wage
gains from collective bargaining affect the demand for union services by workers, and employers’
incentives to resist unionization attempts in opposite directions, so that the relationship between
the union wage premium and organization cannot be predicted a priori. The reduced-form
models put forth in these papers, however, take the wage premium as given, and hence cannot
account for the effect that the threat of collective action has on the determination of this wage
premium. The only attempt to simultaneously explain unionization, employment, and wages
is the work by Edward Lazear (1983). In his model, workers announce an industry-wide wage
demand, and employers decide whether to accept that demand (thus becoming “unionized”)
or to resist unionization at a cost. Therefore, employers are given a passive role, while yet-
unorganized workers are able to make an industry-wide wage demand. The model thus provides
a better description of a unionized industry with centralized bargaining in which employers can
deviate from the collective bargaining agreement at a cost, than of an industry with either no
5For surveys of this literature, see Lewis (1986), Pencavel (1991), Hirsch (1991), and Booth (1995). Section
VI below discusses some of the results of the empirical literature.
6In a related effort, Farber (1990) attempted to decompose the changes in union density into changes in the
demand for and the supply of union services.
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or decentralized bargaining, in which workers can organize at the firm level. In the present
paper, I study the simultaneous determination of wages, employment, and unionization, while,
at the same time, incorporating the strategic wage setting behavior first proposed by Rosen and
Dickens.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a simple version of the model in which
employment choices are given, and the firm only decides what wage to set. Section III extends
this simple model to analyze the determination of employment. Sections IV and V study wage
and employment determination when firms have private information about their profitability,
and section VI reviews the available evidence. Finally, section VII offers some suggestions for
future research, and section VIII cocludes.
II Strategic Wage Determination and Unionization
A The Model
Consider a firm which operates for two periods, and hires labor from a pool of identical workers.
For simplicity, I will assume in this section that the firm does not have any discretion over
employment if it operates: In order to produce its output the firm has to employ a fixed
number of workers.
In the first period, the firm offers a wage w0 to the pool of potential workers, who act as
wage takers and can obtain a wage w outside of the firm. If no worker accepts work at that
wage, the firm closes, and obtains zero revenues. Otherwise, the jobs are filled, and employees
acquire firm-specific skills through on-the-job training. The skills acquired imply that, in the
second period, the value of the relationship between the firm and an existing worker, v, is higher
than the value that could be obtained by hiring an alternative worker that period, v.7
At the beginning of the second period, the firm offers a wage w to its employees, who then
have three options: reject the wage and leave the firm, accept to work at the offered wage, or
establish a union, which entails organization costs c.
Note that the model assumes that workers start unorganized. After learning the firm’s
wage policy, they decide whether to unionize. This assumption tries to capture how actual
labor markets work, at least in the U.S., where, at their inception, firms are generally union
free. Although an employer could choose to recognize a union for the conduct of collective
bargaining before the firm is in operation, this is seldom done, and, in any case, it would be
solely the employer’s choice, as no legal rule compels her to do so. Further, it is reasonable
to expect workers to assess what they can earn without a union, before deciding to join one.
Workers’ organization decision is more a response to employers’ policies than a spontaneous
7Even in the absence of firm-specific skills, firing and hiring costs may create a wedge between the value to
the firm of an existing employee, and that of a new worker. Note that if v = v, there would be no room for
bargaining.
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impulse to be a union member.
Note also that the process of union organization is left unmodelled: workers can organize to
bargain collectively simply by incurring organization costs c. A more realistic interpretation is
that c are the costs workers would incur at the equilibrium of an organization game in which
they would devote time and effort to organizing, and management would fight the organization
attempt. Therefore, c includes not only the direct costs associated with the organizing effort
(or the payment to an established union for its services), but also the expected losses due
to management’s retaliation against union organizers. Modelling this organization game is,
however, beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I take the outcomes of the organization
game as parameters, imposing as little structure as possible on the relations between different
parameters.
If a union is established, collective bargaining takes place, resulting in a wage wu > 0, which,
in this section, is taken as a parameter of the model. Therefore, workers are able to extract
some of the quasi-rents only if they bargain collectively, and none if they do so individually.
This is a simplifying assumption: the analysis applies to all cases in which workers’ bargaining
power increases if they bargain collectively.8
Moreover, the presence of a union may also affect the value of the relationship between
the firm and its workers. If a union is organized, this value becomes vu. Although the model
is static, v and vu are better understood as the net present value of a long term relationship
between the firm and its workers. Unionization can affect this value through a variety of chan-
nels. It can reduce production efficiency directly, by imposing restrictive work practices, or,
in contrast, enhance productivity by facilitating communication between workers and manage-
ment or improving morale. It can also affect input choices by distorting relative prices; reduce
rents if the firm devotes resources to fighting the organization attempt; provide direct utility or
disutility to workers and management; or change the set of self-enforceable contracts available,9
to name a few possibilities. Therefore, vu will generally differ from v.
B Union (Non) Formation under Complete Information
Employers can always guarantee that workers remain nonunion: If they offer a wage w, such
that w > wu− c, workers have no incentive to organize. On the other hand, offering w < wu− c
would trigger organization. Since both outcomes are feasible, unions will only form where
organization is less costly to the firm than union avoidance. Proposition 1 shows that, under
complete information, this can never be the case unless unions increase rents.
8See Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and Segal (1999) for a theoretical analysis of individual wage bargaining, and
the conditions determining the relative advantage of collective versus individual bargaining.
9Many aspects of the employment relationship are implicit, so that the set of feasible contracts is restricted
to those whose provisions regarding these aspects are incentive compatible. By giving workers a powerful device,
the strike, to punish deviations from implicit agreements, the presence of a union may expand the set of incentive
compatible contracts. It can be efficient for employers to ba able to “tie their hands” so as not to renege on their
promises.
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Proposition 1 i. If vu− c ≤ v, at the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game the firm
offers wu − c in the second period, and workers accept the offer.
ii. If vu − c > v, organization takes place with certainty.
Proof. i. If the firm offered w < wu − c in the second period, workers would organize with
certainty, and the firm’s payoff would be piu = vu−wu. By offering w = wu−c+ε, where ε > 0,
the firm ensures that workers do not organize, and its payoff is pi = v−wu+ c−ε. If vu ≤ v+ c,
then for ε small enough, pi > piu. For w = wu − c, workers’ equilibrium strategy cannot
involve a positive probability of organization, as the same argument would apply. Therefore, in
equilibrium, workers must accept any w ≥ wu − c. Similarly, no strategy implying a positive
probability of rejection in the first period could be part of an equilibrium profile, as the firm
would profitably deviate by offering a slightly higher w0. It follows that the unique equilibrium
strategies are: (i) the firm offers wage w0 = − (wu − c) in the first period, and w = wu − c in
the second period; (ii) workers accept any w0 such that w0 ≥ − (wu − c), and any w such that
w ≥ wu − c. If w < wu − c , workers establish a union. If vu − c > v, it is straightforward to
show that piu > pi for any ε ≥ 0, which proves part ii. ¥
Proposition 1 implies that no unions will appear in equilibrium unless they are efficient.
In the absence of contracting problems, this result is hardly surprising, and can be viewed as
a special case of the Coase Theorem. However, it conflicts with the strong prior that unions
are inefficient because they distort input choices, either directly, through restrictions on work
practices (like manning restrictions, or strict job classifications), or indirectly, by altering rel-
ative prices. In fact, in the model, even if unions were merely redistributive (as in efficient
bargaining models of collective bargaining), the presence of organization costs would preclude
union formation. Only if unions increase rents sufficiently is it optimal for management not to
prevent organization. Note that this does not imply that employers prefer unionization to the
competitive outcome, as, unless the positive effect of unions is substantial, profits will be lower
in unionized firms than in nonunion firms paying the alternative wage. However, when workers
can unionize, the firm cannot pay the alternative wage and remain nonunion.
Although the organization game is not analyzed in this paper, note that it is always better for
management to prevent unionization by increasing the wage, than by letting the organization
attempt happen, and then defeating it. If the outcome of the organization game were, say,
that the union is defeated with high probability, the expected payoff from unionization (as
represented by wu) would be low. This would just make it cheap for the employer to prevent
unionization by offering wu − c.
If c is large, unions may not always form when they increase rents (as it can be that vu > v,
but vu − c < v), but proposition 1 has the optimistic implication that workers will not join
unions when it is inefficient to do so. In a later section, I will discuss the robustness of this
result in a more realistic framework, in which employers have better information than workers
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about the firm’s profit prospects. However, I will first analyze how the threat of unionization
affects employment determination in the perfect information context.
III Employment Determination under the Threat of Unioniza-
tion
As discussed in the introduction, the view that the threat of unionization may increase nonunion
wages has generally been taken to imply that it will also cause employment in the nonunion
sector to fall, as nonunion employers move up their labor demand curve.10 In this section, I
extend the simple model presented above to evaluate this claim, and I check whether proposition
1 also applies in this more general framework.
Let now the firm decide how many workers to hire at the beginning of the fist period,
l0. During this first period, workers yield revenues R0(l0), and acquire firm-specific skills.
Therefore, at the end of the first period, existing employees become more valuable to the firm
than alternative workers, that is, R(l) > R(l), where R(l), and R(l) are the revenues the firm
can obtain in the second period if it employs l skilled, or unskilled workers, respectively. R and
R are increasing, concave and twice continuously differentiable functions, with R(0) = R(0) = 0.
R′ is also assumed to be concave.11 Finally, the productivity of skilled workers is higher than
that of unskilled workers, that is, R′(l) > R′0(l) for all l.
At the beginning of the second period, the firm decides how many employees to retain, l,
and offers them a wage w. These employees can unionize by incurring organization costs C(l),
which may vary with the number of employees at the firm. If they do so, collective bargaining
takes place, and, as a result, a wage wu(l) is set, and lu(l) ≤ l employees remain in the firm.
Both lu and wu are expressed as functions of l, since the bargaining outcome may conceivably
depend on the level of initial employment. Hereafter unions will be assumed to have no direct
effect on productive efficiency, that is, Ru(lu) = R(lu), so that the superscript will be omitted.
It is important to note that this does not imply that unions cannot be inefficient: they may still
affect efficiency greatly by distorting input choices.
A The Collective Bargaining Stage
If a union is formed, it negotiates with management over wages and, possibly, employment.
The result of this negotiation will depend on the objectives of the union, and the way in which
bargaining takes place. For simplicity, this paper will assume that the union maximizes the
expected utility of its risk neutral workers, and that it is able to impose its wage demands on
employers. Employers, in turn, keep their prerogative to set employment at will given the wage
set by the union. This “monopoly union” model of collective bargaining is perhaps the model
10For a textbook exposition of this view, see Ehrenberg and Smith (1997).
11This assumption is made only for tractability. It could be dropped at the cost of unnecessary complexity.
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most widely used in applications. Moreover, it has the attractive feature, for our purposes, that
collective bargaining outcomes are highly inefficient. The following lemma summarizes its main
properties, which are also depicted in figure 2.
Lemma 1 In the monopoly union model:
1. lu(l) = l, for l ≤ lu∗, and lu(l) = lu∗, for l > lu∗
2. lu∗ < lc = R′−1(w)
3. wu(l) = R′(l) > w, for l ≤ lu∗, and wu(l) = R′(lu∗) > w, for l > lu∗
4. R(lu(l))− lu(l)wu(l) is increasing in l for l ≤ lu∗, and constant for l > lu∗.12
Proof. (All omitted proofs can be found in the appendix.)
Figure 2: Monopoly Union Model
The choice of this specific bargaining model is made for expositional clarity. It can be shown
that all the results in this paper can be extended to a more general framework in which workers
are allowed to be risk-averse, and the bargaining process need only satisfy a monotonicity
property. This property requires that the trade off between wages and employment depend
on the level of membership: When membership (initial employment) is low, the union can
12Concavity of R′ guarantees the uniqueness of the bargaining outcome. If R′ is not concave, lu(l) may not
be a function, and part 1 of the lemma would not hold. This would made other proofs more cumbersome, but
would not alter the results.
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obtain high wages while guaranteeing the employment of all its members. As employment
increases, marginal workers become less productive, so that unions have to agree to lower wages
to guarantee full employment. Finally, for some level of membership, the union prefers to
accept some unemployment rather than agreeing to further lowering the wage earned by its
employed members. The most commonly used models of collective bargaining, namely the
right-to-manage, and the efficient bargaining models13 satisfy this monotonicity property.14
B The Optimality of Union Avoidance
The intuition behind proposition 1 still holds if the firm is allowed to determine the level of
employment. As long as the firm can mimic the union outcome, paying its workers not to
unionize guarantees profits at least as high as those the firm would obtain if unionized, so that
unions do not form in equilibrium. The next proposition proves the validity of this intuitive
argument, and gives an expression for the wage necessary to prevent union formation.
Proposition 2 Let l∗ be the optimal employment choice. Then, at the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium of the second period subgame, the firm offers
w(l∗) =
lu(l∗)
l∗
wu(l∗) +
l∗ − lu(l∗)
l∗
w − C(l
∗)
l∗
,
if w(l∗) > w, and w otherwise, and workers accept the wage offer.
According to proposition 2, the threat of unionization forces employers to pay workers
more than their reservation wage. Because of this increase in the cost of labor, employers will
tend to hire less workers. This effect is the one usually considered in discussions of the union
threat. However, note that the wage required to prevent unionization itself depends on the
level of employment, so that employment, and not just the wage, becomes a strategic variable:
employment will be set taking into account its effect on workers’ incentives to join a union. The
next section studies how this strategic motive and the wage increase caused by the union threat
interact to determine the firm’s employment choice.
C Employment Determination
When determining the level of employment in the second period, firms will be constrained by
their initial choice of employment, l0, as they cannot hire extra workers with specific skills that
period. To focus on the pure effect of the threat of unionization on employment, however, I
13The right-to-manage model (of which the monopoly union model is a special case) assumes that the union and
the employer negotiate over the wage, while employment is unilaterally set by the latter. The model is justified
on the grounds that, under American labor law, the employer is guaranteed the right to set employment at will,
and that collective bargaining agreements rarely include explicit employment clauses. The efficient bargaining
model, on the other hand, assumes that the employer and the union will strike an efficient agreement, which
generally implies that they bargain jointly over wages and employment.
14I would gladly provide the proof of this statement upon request.
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will abstract from this constraint, and assume that the firm can set l unrestricted by its initial
choice of employment. This is a good approximation to the case in which workers expected
tenure at the firm is substantially longer than the apprenticeship period. Moreover, taking into
account the first period, while making the model more complex, does not qualitatively affect
the results.
Let (Pc) be the problem of a firm with production function R hiring from a competitive
labor market:
MaxlR(l)− wl,
The solution to this problem is lc, defined in lemma 1, which satisfies: R′(lc) = w.
A firm facing a threat of unionization cannot take the wage as given. Proposition 2 implies
that the firm will instead solve (PT ):
Maxl R(l)− w(l)l
s.t. w(l) = max{ l
u(l)
l
(wu(l)− w) + w − C(l)
l
, w}.
Let l∗ denote the solution to this problem.15
Proposition 3 If C(l) is nondecreasing in l, then l∗ ≥ lc and w ≥ w. If C(l) is strictly
increasing in l, and l
u∗
lc
(wu∗ − w) + w − C(lc)lc > w, then l∗ > lc and w ≥ w.
Proposition 3 states that both the wage and employment are higher under the threat of
unionization than in the competitive case. This possibility, first proposed by Dickens (1986),16
runs counter the two prevailing views of the effect of unions on the wages and employment of
nonunion workers discussed in the introduction. On the one hand, once we drop the assumption
that employers are wage takers (and the very presence of unions in an industry should lead us
to do so), it becomes difficult for unionization to lower nonunion wages as predicted by the
crowding view. To do so, the supply shift due to the workers displaced from the union to
the nonunion sector should be large enough to compensate for the upward shift in the wage-
employment schedule caused by the union threat.
On the other hand, despite raising nonunion wages, the threat of unionization does not
reduce employment as predicted by the conventional union threat view. The explanation for this
apparently counter-intuitive result is that, because of the threat of unionization, the marginal
cost of an extra worker is not equal to the wage, so that employment is not on the competitive
15By assuming that the firm pays the same wage to all workers, I am implicitly ruling out the possibility that
the firm can ask new hires to pay to obtain a job. The role of this type of payment is discussed below. Note also
that we should also include a participation constraint for the firm that required profits to be greater than those
that the firm could obtain if it hired unskilled workers at wage w. I will assume that this participation constraint
holds for the relevant range of l.
16Although using a different modelling strategy, Dickens also obtains that unionization may increase both
employment and wages. However, since, in his model, the choice of employment does not influence the bargaining
outcome (or rather, the set of bargaining outcomes), he concludes that the opposite result is also possible.
11
labor demand curve. To avoid unionization, employers are forced to set the wage equal to the
expected utility from organization. Therefore, if the presence of an extra worker decreases this
expected utility, the marginal cost of labor will be less than the going wage. Lemma 1 ensures
that this is the case: hiring an extra worker leads either to lower union wages (if l < lu∗)
or to a greater probability of unemployment (if l > lu∗). In particular, if l > lu∗, increases
in employment do not affect the negotiated wage, so, if C(l) were constant for these levels of
employment, the cost of the marginal worker would be just w, as this marginal worker would
be unemployed if organization took place.
Figure 3 displays the labor demand curve (R′) the wage-employment curve (w(l)), and
the marginal cost curve ((w(l)l)′). The optimal employment level lies at the point where the
marginal revenue and the marginal cost curves intersect.
Figure 3: Employment Determination
As mentioned above, the first period has not been included in the analysis. This omission
could be relevant for two reasons. First, unskilled workers may have lower marginal productivity,
so that the firm may want to employ few of them in the first period, thus limiting the choices in
the second period. And second, the firm can use w0 to make up for the rents lost to workers in
the second period. Because workers will accept any w0 such that their expected earnings at the
firm are at least as large as what they could obtain elsewhere, the firm can recover ex ante the
rents that will be lost to workers in the second period by setting a low enough w0. However, it
can be shown that neither of these considerations would lead firms to employ less workers than
in the competitive case.
Interestingly, Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and (1996b), have also shown that overemployment
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will result from a model in which, due the presence of quasi-rents, wages are determined through
individual bargaining between the employer and her workers. In that case, as in this section,
hiring above the competitive level allows the employer to strike a better wage deal.
IV Union Formation under Asymmetric Information
According to propositions 1 and 2, unionization takes place only when it increases the surplus
associated with the relationship between the firm and its workers. This result was predicated on
the assumption that management and workers have the same information about the expected
outcome of unionization. This assumption, however, is problematic. First, it may not be
representative of the situation in which most workers find themselves when deciding whether to
unionize. One of the main roles of managers is to evaluate the profitability of different courses
of action, and their own choices greatly influence future profitability. Therefore, it is likely
that managers can form a better assessment of the firm’s profit prospects than workers, who
lack managers’ time and skills, and their access to profit-relevant information. Second, assuming
symmetric information may be essential to rule out inefficient unionization: As the literature on
bargaining with asymmetric information shows,17 the presence of asymmetric information may
lead to inefficient outcomes, which would not be reached if all parties had the same information.
Therefore, this section analyzes the firm’s wage determination problem when managers are
better informed than workers about the expected outcome of unionization, and the next section
extends the model to study employment determination.
As in the complete information case, the model consists of two periods. In the first period,
all firms and workers are identical, as management has not yet learned what quasi-rents a skilled
worker would generate, and workers have not yet acquired firm-specific skills. To simplify, I
assume that firms can be of only two types, high-value (H), and low-value (L) firms, with
vH > vL, and vuH > v
u
L. Since we are interested in the possibility of inefficient union formation,
it will be assumed that, for any type i, vi ≥ vui . The commonly known distribution of types
is given by q, the probability that a firm is high-value. At the beginning of the first period,
management offers a wage (w0), and workers decide whether to accept the wage and join the
firm. After workers join the firm, management learns the firm’s type, and workers accumulate
firm-specific human capital.
In the second period, management makes a new wage offer to the employed workers (w),
who, not knowing the firm’s type, do not know the wage that would result from unionization.
Based on the distribution of types, and the wage offer made by the firm, workers update their
beliefs about the firm’s type, and decide whether to accept the wage offer or to organize a union.
If a union formed, the bargaining outcome would depend on the union’s assessment of the
firm’s type. Since union officials typically have time and skills to assess firm performance
17For a review of this literature, see Kennan and Wilson (1993)
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not available to individual workers, it is reasonable to assume that they will learn additional
information with which to update workers’ beliefs. I will assume that, in fact, the union is able
to observe the firm’s type. This assumption is made only for simplicity. All that is needed
for the results is that either the union observes some noisy signal of the firm’s type, or, even
if it has the same information than individual workers, that the outcome of the asymmetric
information bargaining game between the firm and the union involves some separation.18 The
result of union-management bargaining is thus wuH in high-value firms, and w
u
L in low-value
firms, where wuH ≥ wuL.
Figure 4 depicts the asymmetric information model.
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Figure 4: Asymmetric Information Time-line
Apart from the increase in wages, unionization may impose further costs on firms if it
reduces surplus. Two assumptions will be made about the net effect of unions on wages and
total surplus. The first is that unionized H firms earn higher profits than unionized L firms
(vuH − wuH ≥ vuL − wuL).19 The second assumption is that the total cost of unionization is still
higher for H firms once the effect on rents is taken into account ((vH−vuH)+wuH > (vL−vuL)+wuL).
That is, even if unions reduced rents more in L firms, this effect would not be larger than the
effect of unionization on the wage bill.20 These two assumptions are summarized in the following
one:
Assumption (Sorting). 0 ≤ (vuH − wuH)− (vuL − wuL) ≤ (vH − vL).
In the usual terminology, this assumption is a sorting, or single crossing,21 condition, as it
implies that H firms are willing to pay more to reduce the probability of organization.
To see how the presence of asymmetric information modifies the results in previous sections,
first note that, if no information is credibly communicated to workers, their expected wage from
18In fact, most results –all involving separating equilibria– would still hold, even if none of these requirements
held.
19Assuming the contrary would be highly problematic. If vuH −wuH < vuL−wuL, then H firms could, in principle,
waste money (or adopt L’s inferior behavior) to become like an L firm, which would erase the difference.
20The opposite assumption would imply that unions have a (sufficiently) greater proportional effect on rents
in L firms.
21Graphically, it implies that the isoprofit lines of H and L firms on the space of wages and probabilities of
organization can cross only once.
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unionization is qwuH +(1− q)wuL− c. If q or wuH −wuL is high enough, this expected wage will be
high, making it very costly for L firms to avoid organization. L firms will try to signal their low
value to workers but they cannot credibly do so while at the same time avoiding organization,
as in that case it would clearly be optimal for H firms to imitate them. Therefore, if the ex
ante expected wage from organization is high enough, the only alternative for L firms is to
trigger organization, thus revealing their type to the union. H firms will still find it profitable
to avoid the risk of unionization, so that only L firms become unionized. If the ex ante expected
union wage is not too high, however, L firms may avoid organization with positive probability
by paying the same wage offered by H firms. In this case, if workers use mixed strategies,
unionization can occur in H firms if the probability with which workers organize is low enough.
The analysis below formalizes this argument.
Let ρ : <+ → [0, 1] represent the worker’s beliefs after observing a wage offer, so that
ρ (x) = Pr (v = vH |w = x) is the probability the worker assigns to the firm being high-value,
given that a wage x has been offered.
Let o : <+ → [0, 1] be the behavioral strategy of the worker in the second period, where
o (w) ∈ [0, 1] specifies the probability with which the worker will organize given that the wage
w was offered.
Let Pi be the behavioral strategy (a probability measure over wages) of a type-i firm in the
second period, and let Si be the support of Pi.22
Lemma 2 There does not exist a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in which H firms become
unionized with certainty.
Proof. At any equilibrium, it must be the case that, for w > wuH − c, o (w) = 0. Thus, if an H
firm offers w′ = wuH − c+ ε, for ε > 0, its payoff is vH −wuH + c− ε, which, for ε small enough,
will always be higher than vuH − wuH . ¥
Therefore, H firms always find it more profitable to avoid organization altogether rather than
offering some wage for which organization would occur with certainty. The next proposition
shows that equilibria in which H firms avoid organization, and L firms are organized with
positive probability always exist. Note that, in what follows, I will discuss only the second
period subgame. The first-period wage will be set so as to make workers indifferent between
the job and alternative employment, or, if such a wage were not feasible, to the minimum wage
feasible.
Proposition 4 i. There exist fully revealing PBE in which L firms get organized with proba-
bility
uLs ∈
[
wuH − wuL
(wuH − wuL) + vH − vuH + c
,min{1, w
u
H − wuL
vL − vuL + c
}
]
,
22Although Pi is defined over sets, abusing notation, I will write P (w) to express P ({w}) when w is played
with positive probability.
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and H firms prevent organization with certainty by offering a wage wH = wuH − c.
ii. No other fully revealing PBE exist.
If the ex ante expected utility from unionization is large, or workers beliefs are such that,
when faced with a low wage off the equilibrium path, they attribute a high enough probability
to H firms having chosen that wage, a separating equilibrium will obtain. Since it is cheaper
for L firms to endure unionization, they may choose to do so to “signal” their type, and avoid
being taken as an H firm. However, if the costs of unionization to L firms are relatively large,
and the ex ante expected wage is not too high, L firms might find it optimal not to signal their
type. As the next proposition show, if L firms prefer to pay the ex ante expected wage than to
become unionized with certainty, pooling equilibria will exist.
Proposition 5 1. If
(1) vL − (qwuH + (1− q)wuL − c) ≥ vuL − wuL, then :
i. There exist pooling PBE23 in which both types of firms avoid organization with certainty,
and the wage is
wp ∈ [qwuH + (1− q)wuL − c,min {vL − vuL + wuL, wuH − c}] .24
ii. There exist pooling PBE in which both types of firms set wp = qwuH + (1 − q)wuL − c,
and face a positive probability of organization.
2. If condition (1) does not hold, no pooling equilibria exist.
Therefore, if it is not too costly for L firms to pass as H firms, pooling equilibria, at which
both firms face the same probability of organization, will exist. At some of these equilibria,
H firms take the risk of becoming unionized in exchange for a low wage. In others, both H
and L firms avoid organization with certainty. Therefore, propositions 4, and 5 together imply
that, against the widely held view that unionization is more likely in more profitable firms, the
probability of organization is never higher in H firms than in L firms. In the next section, I
discuss this result in greater detail.25
23It is well known that forward-induction refinements, like the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps (1987)) can
eliminate a great number of equilibria in signaling games. The equilibria in this section, however, are immune
to this sort of refinements. If a H firm deviated from its equilibrium behavior by choosing a wage w < wuH − e
that could not have been preferred by a L firm to its equilibrium play, and thus signaled its type, workers would
unionize: knowing that the firm is H, their payoff from organizing, wuH − e, is greater than the offered wage.
24However, note that, if we restricted beliefs to be nondecreasing in the wage offer, all equilibria with wp >
qwuH + (1 − q)wuL − c would be eliminated (as they would require ρ(w) > q for w < wp), and the only pooling
wage would be wp = qw
u
H + (1− q)wuL − c.
25In this section, we have not considered all possible equilibria. Apart from the equilibria analyzed in this
section, Ruiz-Verdu´ (2000) shows that there exist equilibria in which firms play mixed strategies, but their
existence does not change this result.
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A Implications
a Unionization and Rents
It is often argued that workers will be more likely to join unions in those firms or industries
earning larger rents (e.g. Hirsch (1991), p. 60), as the demand for union services should be
greater where the potential gains from organization are larger. This would be true if firms did
not act at all to prevent organization, or if their actions were unrelated to rent size. However,
large gains to workers mean large losses to the firm. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect
profitable employers to resist union organization more strongly, a possibility explored in a series
of papers26 which have investigated employers’ responses to union organization attempts. The
analysis in those papers, however, does not yield any a priori prediction regarding the net effect
of rents on the probability of organization. The model in this paper, in contrast, looks at the
actions that employers may take prior to organization to prevent it from being attempted in
the first place,27 and yields the prediction that the probability of unionization within a group
of otherwise identical firms is negatively related to the size of the rents to be divided between
the firm and its employees.
No prediction can be made a priori about the relationship between ex ante expected rents
and unionization (or, put differently, about the probability of organization across firms known to
differ ex ante in their expected rents), as the probability of organization does not depend on the
location, but on the shape of the distribution of rents. Only if rents are so low (and consequently
union wages too) that unionization is ex ante unprofitable for workers independently of the
wage offer, will knowledge of ex ante expected rents be informative about the probability of
organization. A fall in rents known to to make unionization unprofitable for any wage is certain
to bring the probability of organization down to zero.
b Determinants of Unionization
The probability of organization, for given parameter values, will be determined by the proba-
bility with which organization can take place in different types of equilibrium, and the types of
equilibrium that can obtain given those parameter values. As shown in the previous section,
there are two possible regimes, depending on whether condition (1) holds.
1. Separation. (vL − (qwuH + (1− q)wuL − c) < vuL − wuL). Proposition 4 shows that in this case
H firms avoid organization with certainty, and L firms become organized with probability uLs.
The ex ante probability of organization is thus
us = (1− q)uLs ∈
[
(1− q)(wuH − wuL)
(wuH − wuL) + vH − vuH + c
,min{(1− q), (1− q)(w
u
H − wuL)
vL − vuL + c
}
]
26See Freeman (1986), Freeman and Kleiner (1990), or Abowd and Farber (1990).
27As discussed in section II, this does not mean that the model deprives managers of the possibility of resisting
organization. If the organization game is reached, managers may decide to fight organization, and their ability
to do so will determine wu, and c.
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2. Multiple Equilibria. (vL − (qwuH + (1− q)wuL − c) ≥ vuL − wuL). The ex ante probability of
organization in a separating equilibrium is as described above, and, in a pooling equilibrium
the proof of proposition 4 shows that it is
up ≤ (1− q)(w
u
H − wuL)
(1− q)(wuH − wuL) + vH − vuH + c
Inspection of the above expressions shows that, for a given regime, increases in (wuH −wuL),
and decreases in c, (vH − vuH), and (vL − vuL) increase the bounds of the possible values of the
probability of organization. Moreover, these changes may also lead to a switch from regime 1 to
regime 2. This switch reduces the lower bound of the interval of possible values of the probability
of organization (from (1−q)(w
u
H−wuL)
(wuH−wuL)+vH−vuH+c to 0), and it is easy to check that it also reduces the
upper bound if Assumption Sorting is slightly strengthened to require vH − vuH + (1− q)wuH >
vL − vuL + (1 − q)wuL. Despite the fact that the multiplicity of equilibria precludes precise
comparative statics results, we can thus say that, if any of the above parameter changes affects
the set of possible equilibria, it will either add new equilibria involving a higher probability of
organization, or eliminate equilibria with lower probability of organization than the remaining
ones.28 Therefore, the probability of organization will increase (in this sense) if costs of union
organization or the efficiency cost of unions fall, or if the spread of the distribution of union
negotiated wages widens.
c Union Effects on Profits
Assuming that vu ≤ v ensures that in the model unions reduce profits. If we allowed vu to be
larger than v, however, unions could reduce or increase profits. Therefore, if unions can enhance
efficiency the model cannot predict a priori their effect on profits.
More interestingly, the model implies that conventional estimates of this effect may be
biased. Propositions 4, and 5 imply that L firms are overrepresented among unionized firms,
while H firms are overrepresented among nonunion firms. Therefore, the difference between the
average profits of union and nonunion firms overestimates the (average) union effect. In the
context of conventional OLS estimation, propositions 4, and 5 imply that if we estimate a profit
equation with a union status dummy as a regressor, this variable will be negatively correlated
with the error term (those firms with lower unobservable profitability are more likely to become
organized). Therefore, the OLS coefficient for union status will overestimate (in absolute value)
the negative effect of unionization on profits (or underestimate its positive effect).
The model also implies that the use of longitudinal data may not ameliorate the problem, as
changes in union status are likely to be caused by changes in unobserved profitability. Therefore
the assumption of fixed firm effects cannot be used to identify the effect of unions on profits. The
28See Ruiz-Verdu´ (2000) for a formal definition of the concepts of nonincreasing and nondecreasing in this
context, and for a derivation of the comparative statics results when equilibria in which firms play mixed strategies
are allowed too.
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role of organization costs in the determination of unionization, however, suggests that finding
an instrument that is likely to be correlated with the costs of organization (e.g. state laws, or
demographic or attitudinal characteristics) but not with firm profitability could be a way to
control for the above bias.
d Union-Nonunion Wage Gap
If we letWG be the OLS estimate of the union wage gap (that is, the difference between average
union and nonunion wages among ex ante identical firms), propositions 4, and 5 imply that:
Corollary 1 WG is increasing in c, (vH − vuH), and (vL − vuL), and decreasing in (wuH − wuL).
Therefore WG and the probability of organization will be negatively correlated.
Therefore, the argument that a greater wage gap should be associated with an increased proba-
bility of organization does not hold true once the determination of both wages and unionization
are studied simultaneously. Moreover, as with the probability of organization, there is no a
priori relationship between ex ante expected rents and the wage gap. Therefore, without fur-
ther knowledge of the shape of the distribution of rents, we cannot conclude that the wage gap
should be higher in a more profitable industry (that is, one with higher ex ante expected rents).
Propositions 4, and 5 also imply that the OLS estimation of the effect of unionization on
wages will be biased due to firm selection into the union sector. In this case, the bias will have
a negative sign, as high-wage firms (H firms) are more likely to remain nonunion.29 However,
note that this does not imply that OLS estimates are necessarily biased downwards, as there
might be other sources of bias associated with unobservable worker or job characteristics. These
sources of bias have not been contemplated in this paper (where all workers are identical), and
are likely to operate in the opposite direction (with, say, workers with higher unobservable skills
more likely to hold higher paying union jobs).
V Employment Determination Under Asymmetric Information
Asymmetric information can lead to inefficient unionization because less profitable firms trigger
it to reveal their type. If firms set employment as well as wages, however, L firms may have
another instrument to signal their type: If labor is less productive in those firms, they can
reduce employment to dissuade H firms, for which the reduction would be more costly, from
imitating them. If L firms found it profitable to signal their type in this way, then at least some
firms would hire less workers than predicted by the complete information model. Moreover,
the availability of a signal other than unionization may also imply that inefficient organization
29If we cannot control for all observable firm characteristics, this bias could be reduced, or even reversed if,
in an industry in which unionization takes place with positive probability, there are firms with rents so low that
unionization is not ex ante profitable for any wage offer. In this case, this low-wage firms will be overrepresented
within the nonunion firms.
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is not possible even under asymmetric information. This section addresses these questions by
analyzing employment determination in the presence of asymmetric information.
The structure of the model is the same as in the previous section, except that now firms
also decide how many workers to hire each period. As in the previous section, firms learn their
profitability at the beginning of the second period, before making their wage and employment
choices for that period. There are two types of firms, which differ in their second-period revenue
functions, which are RH for H firms, and RL for L firms, with RH(l) > RL(l) for all l > 0, and
R′H(l) > R
′
L(l), for all l ≥ 0. The ex ante probability of a firm being of type H is q, assumed to
be common knowledge.
Workers do not observe R. After observing (w, l) they update their beliefs about the firm’s
type, which can be summarized by q(w, l), the probability that workers assign to the firm being
of type H. These beliefs and the expected bargaining outcome at each type of firm determine
workers’ expected utility from unionization. As in the previous section, it is assumed that the
union is able to observe the firm’s type, so that the expected bargaining outcome for each firm
type is determined as in section III. These bargaining outcomes satisfy the property that unions
extract larger rents from more profitable firms.30
Lemma 3 Let (lui (l), w
u
i (l)) (i ∈ {L,H}) be the bargaining outcome at a firm of type i for a
given l. Then
luH(l)(w
u
H(l)− w) ≥ luL(l)(wuL(l)− w) (1)
This result implies that, under complete information, H firms need to pay more to avoid union-
ization:
Corollary 2 Let wH(l) =
luH(l)
l (w
u
H(l) − w) + w, wL(l) = l
u
L(l)
l (w
u
L(l) − w) + w, and w(l) =
q(w, l)wH(l) + (1− q(w, l))wL(l). Then, for any q(w, l), wL(l) ≤ wH(l), and w(l) ≤ wH(l).
In what follows, I will abstract from first-period considerations, and focus on how the threat of
unionization affects the desired level of employment in the second period. Therefore, firms are
supposed to choose employment unrestricted by their initial choice of employment, l0. As in
section III, this omission does not alter the nature of the results.
To reduce the multiplicity of equilibria, in this section equilibria will be required to satisfy
the Cho and Kreps Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps (1987)). This criterion requires out-
of-equilibrium beliefs to assign probability zero to players choosing strategies that are certain
to yield a payoff lower than their equilibrium payoff, and that, on the other hand, could be
30As in section III, all results generalize to any bargaining process satisfying this property, the aforementioned
monotonicity assumption, and such that lu(l), and wu(l) are continuous functions.
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preferred by other players to their respective equilibrium payoffs.31 Requiring equilibria to
satisfy the Intuitive Criterion rules out all pooling equilibria.
Proposition 6 There are no pooling equilibria.
At a pooling equilibrium, the pooling wage wp is greater than wL(lp), where lp is the pooling
level of employment. Therefore, it is possible to increase profits by decreasing employment, if
by doing so workers were led to believe that the firm is of type L. Now, the fact that R′H > R
′
L
implies that a given reduction in employment lowers H’s revenues more than L’s revenues. Thus,
it is possible to find an l < lp such that H prefers the equilibrium play to (wL(l), l), while L
prefers (wL(l), l) to (wp, lp), which violates the Intuitive Criterion.
Let (w∗i , l
∗
i ) be the choice of a firm of type i (i ∈ {L,H}) under complete information,
computed in proposition 3. The next proposition shows that, at any equilibrium in which firms
reveal their type, H firms will set (w∗H , l
∗
L)
Proposition 7 At any fully separating equilibrium, H firms avoid organization with certainty,
and set (wH , lH) = (w∗H , l
∗
H).
This result follows directly from corollary 2. Independently of workers’ beliefs, H firms need
not pay more than w∗H to avoid unionization if they select l
∗
H . Therefore they can always do
better by choosing their complete information optimum rather than any other (w, l) pair that
revealed their type.
Lemma 4 Let l < l∗H be defined by: RH(l)−wL(l)l = RH(l∗H)−w∗H l∗H . Then RH(l∗H)−w∗H l∗H >
RH(l)− wL(l)l for any l < l.
That is, if l < l then an H firm prefers to set (w∗H , l
∗
H) and pass as H than to set (wL(l), l),
and convince workers it is of type L.
Proposition 8 If l > l∗L then at any fully separating equilibrium, lL = l
∗
L and organization is
avoided with certainty.
The interpretation of the proposition is straightforward. If the differences between firms
are such that H firms could not possibly find it profitable to imitate the optimal behavior of L
firms, then the presence of asymmetric information is irrelevant: each firm behaves exactly as
if there were no informational asymmetries. In this case, the overemployment results found for
the perfect information case would extend to all types of firms under asymmetric information.
Proposition 9 If l ≤ l∗L, and
RL(l)− wL(l)l ≥ RL(lu∗L )− wu∗L lu∗L , (2)
31All results below regarding fully separating equilibria would still hold if we imposed the weaker requirement
that workers do not assign a positive probability to firms playing strictly dominated strategies.
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i. There exist fully separating equilibria at which (wL, lL) =
(
wL(l), l
)
and o(wL, lL) = 0.
ii. There exist no other fully separating equilibria at which o(wL, lL) = 0.
ii. There exist fully separating equilibria with lL > l and o(wL, lL) > 0.
Proposition 10 If l ≤ l∗L, and
RL(l)− wL(l)l < RL(lu∗L )− wu∗L lu∗L , (3)
i. There exist fully separating equilibria at which L firms become organized with certainty
ii. There do not exist fully separating equilibria at which L firms avoid organization with
certainty.
iii. There exist fully separating equilibria at which o(wL, lL) ∈ (0, 1).
If l ≤ l∗L, H firms would like to imitate L firms if the latter were behaving as in the complete
information case. Therefore, L firms will alter their behavior to reveal their type to workers.
Because the marginal productivity of labor is lower in these firms, they may signal their type
by reducing employment to levels for which imitation would not be profitable for H firms. On
the other hand, since it is also less costly for L firms to endure unionization, they may trigger
organization to reveal their type, as in the previous section. If condition (2) holds, L firms will
signal their type by reducing employment rather than by becoming organized.32 Therefore, the
overemployment effect of the threat of unionization will be reduced in L firms, and could even be
reversed. If lu∗L < lLc (where lLc is the level of employment that would result if L firms acquired
their labor input in a perfectly competitive labor market), then it is possible that lL < lLc.
However, there is a limit to this reduction in employment, as condition (2) ensures that l
cannot be much lower than lu∗L (if organization costs were zero, condition (2) would guarantee
that lL ≥ lu∗L ). On the other hand, if condition 3 holds, the level of employment necessary to
avoid being imitated by H firms is so low, that L firms prefer to trigger unionization to signal
their type. Therefore, the result in propositions 4, and 5 is robust: less profitable firms are more
likely to become unionized.
Obtaining comparative statics results in this case is not possible without imposing specific
functional forms for the revenue and cost functions. However, it can be easily checked that,
at least if we restrict our attention to pure strategy equilibria (which, as mentioned in the
previous footnote, are the only ones in which beliefs are monotonic), an upward shift in C will
make organization less likely and increase the empirical wage gap, as in the previous section.
Therefore, we can expect the negative relationship between the rate of organization and the
wage gap derived in the previous section to hold here as well.
32Even if condition (2) holds, equilibria with a positive probability of organization may exist, in which L
firms use both signals at once. However, equilibria of this form have the property that workers’ beliefs are not
monotonic: they require workers to believe that a firm is of type L if it offers (wL(lL), lL), while believing that
any other (w, l) such that w = wL(l) and l ∈ [l, lL) could have been chosen by a firm of type H. This feature
makes them less compelling predictions than the pure strategy equilibria.
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Although the model is static and partial equilibrium, it suggests a potential cyclical implica-
tion of the threat of unionization in an uncertain environment. If uncertainty has an aggregate
component, and managers have better information about the realization of uncertainty, the neg-
ative effect of an adverse shock to firms’ profitability will be amplified by the need to convince
workers that the negative aggregate shock has indeed occurred.33 The threat of unionization
may thus lead to greater employment responses to shocks than those implied by a competitive
labor market, a possibility that should be explored further.
VI Empirical Evidence
In this section, I make use of the empirical literature on the determinants and effects of union-
ization to provide a tentative assessment of the model’s predictive performance. However, one
should keep in mind that the relationship between the model’s variables and the variables esti-
mated in this literature is, generally, far from perfect (for example, while I have looked at the
average wage gap among ex ante identical firms, the data can, at best, offer reliable estimates
at the industry level), and that, except for the paper by Ruback and Zimmerman discussed
below, the studies reviewed do not provide explicit tests of the predictions of the model.
A Joint behavior of union density and the wage gap
Since the early 1970s, the U.S. has experienced a large decline in the proportion of private sector
workers who belong to unions. On the other hand, as Figure 1 shows, the union wage premium
seems to have remained constant, or even trended upwards.34 In fact, although his results are
only exploratory, Freeman (1986) finds a negative correlation between the aggregate wage gap
and new unionization. Moreover, a clearer negative correlation emerges when the analysis is
done at the industry level.35 Finally, data from 1930-1974, although less reliable than more
recent micro-data, also point in the direction of a negative correlation between union density
and the wage gap, or at least of an absence of a positive correlation. In particular, those periods
in which the greatest increases in union density took place were accompanied by lower union
wage gaps than periods of union decline or moderate growth.36
33This possibility was first analyzed for the case in which firms and workers agree to implicit insurance contracts
(Grossman and Hart (1981), Grossman and Hart (1983), Grossman, Hart, and Maskin (1983), Azariadis (1983)).
Acemoglu (1995), and Kennan (2000) have also studied the cyclical effects of asymmetric information when
workers and firms bargain over the wage.
34A similar pattern can be observed in the U.K. See Blanchflower (1997), Andrews, Bell, and Upward (1998),
Stewart (1991), Stewart (1995). The studies reviewed, using different datasets and methods, do not agree on the
sign and size of the change in the wage gap. One can, however, conclude that no significant decline in the wage
gap has taken place.
35See Linneman and Wachter (1986), Linneman, Wachter, and Carter (1990). The latter paper finds a negative
coefficient for the union wage gap in union density equations for all major industries, except construction and
government, for the years 1973–86.
36See, Pencavel (1991), pp. 26-30.
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The time-series behavior of union density and the wage gap thus seems consistent with
the predictions of this paper, while more difficult to reconcile with theories that explain the
changes in union density as a result of changes in expected wage gains from organization. The
model’s predictions are also consistent with the cross-sectional pattern of union density and
the union wage premium in the U.S.. Inspection of this pattern shows a negative correlation
between the two variables when comparing regions (the U.S. South vs. other regions, or rural
vs. urban areas), sectors (the private vs. the public sector), or establishments of different size
(with smaller establishments being characterized by a smaller union density and a higher wage
gap), at least for manufacturing.37 The same pattern seems to hold when comparing different
countries, even if we limit the comparison to relatively similar countries like the U.S., Canada
and the U.K.. Especially interesting is the case of the U.S. and Canada, given their relative
similarity (also in what respects to collective bargaining regulation.) The higher union density
in Canada is not accompanied by higher wage premia.
B Determinants of unionization
Although I am not aware of studies specifically aimed at testing the influence of profitability
on the probability of organization, two studies, using different datasets and methodologies, find
either no or negative correlation between firm growth (Bronars and Deere (1993)) or profitabil-
ity (Bronfenbrenner (1997)) and unionization. These results do not provide conclusive evidence
for or against the predictions of this paper (which, without further controls, could only be con-
clusively falsified by a strong positive effect of profitability on the probability of organization),
but they certainly cast doubt on the common rent-seeking view that unions will organize more
profitable establishments.
With respect to the effect that potential efficiency consequences of unionization have on the
probability of organization, Duncan and Stafford (1980) provide evidence that unionization is
associated with working conditions “which require interdependent worker behavior as part of the
production process”(ibid. p. 369), such as working with machines, work pace, or inflexible hours
of work. In the authors’ interpretation, these working conditions make collective representation
efficient, thus supporting the relevance of efficiency explanations of union incidence. On the
other hand, the evidence on the productivity effects of unions is mixed, although Freeman (2000)
reports that a majority of studies find a positive productivity effect.
37This description is based on Lewis’s comprehensive survey of empirical measures of the wage gap (Lewis
(1986)). I am not aware of any more recent study showing correlations of a different sign. Note that we have not
presented any result on how the wage gap varies with the extent of unionism in an industry, which would be a
more direct test of the theory. The reason is that results seem to be extremely sensitive to the choice of variable
measuring the extent of unionism, and to pick up the effect of omitted variables more than effects of unionism.
For a discussion, see Lewis (1986).
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C Asymmetric information and unionization
The model predicts that firms with negative private information about their profit prospects
will be more likely to become organized. Ruback and Zimmerman (1984) provide an ideal
test of this prediction in a study written with the objective of estimating the effect of unions
on profits. Using a sample of large publicly traded firms in which at least one unionization
attempt takes place during the period 1962-1980, the authors computed abnormal stock returns
for the month in which the union petitions for an election, and the month in which the election
outcome is certified. If the election petition conveys no information about the firm’s type, the
stock market price of a firm where a union election is petitioned should decrease at the date
of the petition (since a petition is associated with a greater probability of organization), but
should go up, at least partially, if the union loses the election. If, however, there is a signaling
effect, the positive impact of a union loss on the stock price should be smaller, since, although
the union loss implies higher future profits (driving the price up), the negative information
conveyed by the unionization attempt implies that profit expectations are lower after the union
loss than before the election petition. Ruback and Zimmerman report that, in the month of
an election petition, abnormal returns are negative and statistically significant both in those
firms in which the unionization attempt will end up being successful, and in those where it will
lead to a union loss. Although the negative abnormal returns are smaller in the latter group of
firms, the difference is not statistically significant. In the month in which the election outcome
is certified, abnormal returns are negative in firms where the union wins and in those in which
the union loses, although in both cases they are not significantly different from zero. That is,
the news of a union loss does not significantly increase profit expectations. This result provides
firm support for the asymmetric information explanation of unionization.38
Bronars and Deere (1993) also report that GNP growth was significantly above average
before periods of union recognition activity, and significantly below average after those periods,
a finding also consistent with the asymmetric information explanation for unionization.
D The effect of unions on nonunion wages
When asked about the motivation for their wage and employment policies, employers declare to
take into account the expected influence of those policies on workers’ incentives to unionize, at
least when they perceive unionization as probable (Rees and Schultz (1970), Foulkes (1980)). In
particular, the employers questioned in those studies set high wages to keep unions at bay. In
line with these findings, most cross-sectional studies estimate a positive effect of union density
on nonunion wages (see Neumark and Wachter (1995) for a review of these studies). Insofar as
38It could be argued that this may be due to investors’ anticipation of the election result. But the fact that
those firms where the union will lose the election experience significant negative abnormal returns the month of
the election petition (and not significantly different from the abnormal returns of firms in which the union will
win) suggests that investors’ anticipation is not complete.
25
the variation in union density is caused by differences in organization costs, the model in this
paper would yield the same prediction.
However, cross-sectional studies have been criticized for not controlling for unmeasured
industry characteristics associated with different degrees of unionization. If unionization were
more likely in industries that would have paid higher wages in any case, cross-sectional estimates
could be just capturing this fact. Neumark and Wachter (1995) used panel data to control for
unmeasured time-invariant industry characteristics, and finds a negative effect of changes in
union density on nonunion inter-industry wage differentials. However, their study is subject
to a similar criticism than the one they raise for the cross-sectional studies, as the changes
in industry conditions that lead to changes in union density are likely to be correlated with
nonunion wages as well. Moreover, when they estimate the effect of local (at the SMSA39
level) union density on nonunion wages, they find a significant positive effect of union density
on inter-SMSA nonunion wage differentials. Since displaced workers are much more likely to
change industries than to move to a different city or county (Herz (1990)), this finding provides
strong evidence against the view that unionization lowers the wages of nonunion workers by
increasing the supply of labor to the nonunion sector.
In the study that most closely approximates the ideal experiment to test the model’s pre-
dictions, Ichniowski, Freeman, and Lauer (1989) trace the effects of changes in state collective
bargaining laws on union and nonunion police compensation. They find that changes in bargain-
ing laws that make it easier for public sector employees to bargain collectively increase union
density, and increase the compensation of both union and nonunion police. Unfortunately, these
results refer only to a particular class of public sector workers, so that no general conclusions
can be extracted.
VII Suggestions for Further Research
The analysis in this paper provides a first step in the understanding of the operation of partially
unionized labor markets, and the determinants of unionization. This section outlines some
directions along which this research can be fruitfully extended.
First, studying the consequences of the model for market equilibrium would allow us to
determine the net effect of different parameter changes on wages, aggregate employment, and
union membership. The latter may be especially important because several variables in the
model are likely to depend on aggregate union membership. For example, costs of organization
may depend on the number of unionized workers in an industry. Moreover, we must take these
externalities into consideration if we are to compare the performance of different systems of
collective bargaining (for example, decentralized versus industry-level or regional bargaining),
as one of the main dimensions along which these systems vary is the degree to which labor market
39Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.
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participants internalize organization and bargaining externalities. Although the model indicates
that increases in union density are likely to be associated with an improvement of the welfare
of nonunion workers, the analysis of market equilibrium is also necessary to assess possible
equilibrium effects that may alter this prediction. Finally, since it is difficult to obtain reliable
measures below the industry level for most of the variables of interest, aggregate predictions
should also be easier to bring to the data.
Second, an explicitly dynamic extension of the model would clarify the model’s cyclical
implications, and allow us to obtain predictions that can be more readily tested using time-
series data. It would also shed light on the factors behind the development of unionism in the
U.S. private sector, characterized by a rapid rise in union density in the period between the
Great Depression and the mid 1950s, and by a monotonic decline ever since. To understand
this development, the model in this paper indicates that special attention should be paid to the
evolution of the costs of organization to workers.
Third, although the review of the evidence conducted in this paper is supportive of the
predictions of the model, empirical work specifically aimed at testing these predictions, and those
generated by the extensions outlined above, is required. In particular, it would be especially
fruitful to obtain good measures of the costs of organization to workers, and their relation to
wages, employment and union membership.
Lastly, more sophisticated contract forms should also be considered. The model restricts
contracts to be noncontingent, while suggesting that efficiency gains could be possible if com-
pensation were made to depend on potentially verifiable variables like profits or employment.
Similarly, implicit contracts which made compensation contingent on firm profitability could
be, in principle, sustainable if firms and workers interact repeatedly. Studying possible private
responses to the inefficiency caused by asymmetric information is also necessary to evaluate the
potential for efficiency-enhancing policy intervention. In particular, it would be worth investi-
gating whether measures aimed at reducing the informational asymmetries between firms and
workers, such as, say, compulsory worker representation on company boards (even if lacking
any decision rights), or information disclosure requirements could alleviate this inefficiency.
VIII Conclusion
Nonunion employers in a partially unionized industry are not likely to behave as described
by standard competitive models. Rather than taking wages as given, they will set wages and
employment strategically to ensure that their workers do not organize. In this paper, I have
shown that as a result, labor market outcomes will depart significantly from those derived from
models in which the nonunion sector is assumed to operate competitively.
In particular, nonunion wages will be set above the competitive level to eliminate workers’
incentives to organize. Despite this increase in the average cost of labor, employment will
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generally not fall, as nonunion firms have the incentive to overemploy to reduce the average
rents that workers can expect to obtain if they organize. If employers are better informed than
workers about profitability, however, less profitable firms may have an even stronger incentive
to lay off workers, if by doing so they can convince the remaining employees of their bad profit
outlook, thus persuading them to moderate their wage demands. Although its macroeconomic
consequences are yet to be derived explicitly, the model suggests that the effect on employment
of negative shocks could be amplified by firms’ recourse to layoffs as a device to lower wage
demands and avoid unionization.
By explicitly modelling employer behavior towards unionization, this paper has also provided
a theory of the incidence of unionism. The interest of such a theory is twofold. On the one
hand, it offers a new framework to study the causes and consequences of the decline of U.S.
unionism in the last two decades. Moreover, unlike one-sided theories, which take either wages
or union density as given, this framework is able to offer predictions about the joint behavior
of these variables. Of special interest is the prediction that union density and the union wage
premium will tend to be negatively correlated, which seems to fit the pattern observed in the
U.S.. This pattern is, however, difficult to rationalize by theories of union formation that take
the wage premium as given.
On the other hand, a theory of the simultaneous determination of unionization, wages and
employment addresses the key issue in the empirical literature examining the effects of labor
unions, namely the nonrandom determination of union status. According to the model, the
probability of union organization does not depend on observable firm characteristics not di-
rectly related to the costs of organization to workers, or the potential effect of unions on total
rents. It follows that observable measures of profitability are not likely to be informative to
predict union organization. In contrast, unobservable profit prospects play a large role in the
determination of union status. That is, unionization is likely to be correlated with unobserv-
able firm characteristics, which, at the same time, have a direct effect on firm performance.
Therefore, the model predicts that OLS estimates of the effects of unionization will be biased.
Against the often held assumption that unions will organize the (unobservably) more profitable
firms, the model predicts that organization will be more likely in (unobservably) less profitable
firms, and thus pins down the sign of the estimation bias. Apart from cautioning us about the
existence and sign of this bias, the model also has implications concerning possible remedies. In
particular, it does not favor the use of longitudinal data to identify union effects, as fixed firm
characteristics, as long as they are observable by workers, will be unrelated to changes in union
status. The role of organization costs in the determination of union status, however, suggests
that factors unrelated to firm performance but correlated with these costs (like changes in the
legal environment regulating collective bargaining, or differences in workers’ attitudes towards
unions) may be used as instruments for unionization.
28
IX Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Let problem (A) be: maxlu UA(lu) = lu(R′(lu) − w). If UA is strictly
concave, then problem (A) has at most one solution, lu∗, and, assuming R′(0) > w, and R′(l) <
w for l large enough, lu∗ > 0 is given by R′(lu∗) = w + lu∗R′′(lu∗) > w. Therefore, lu∗ < lc.
Since U ′′A = 2R
′′ + luR′′′, concavity of R′ guarantees concavity of UA. Let wu∗ = R′(lu∗) > w.
Now, the union solves:
max
lu,wu
lu(wu − w)
s.t. lu = argmax{R(lu)− wulu, for lu ≤ l}
It cannot be the case that wu < R′(l), since in that case lu = l, and the union would be better
off setting wu = R′(l), which would increase the wage without lowering employment. Therefore
wu ≥ R′(l) for all l. It follows that lu will satisfy R′(lu) = wu. The problem of the union thus
becomes:
max
lu
lu(R′(lu)− w)
s.t. lu ≤ l
If lu∗ is feasible, then it maximizes this problem. Thus lu(l) = lu∗, for l ≥ lu∗. Now, concavity
of UA ensures that the derivative of the maximand is positive for l < lu∗ R′(lu∗)−w−lu∗R′′(lu∗) >
0 for l < lu∗, therefore for l < lu∗, lu(l) = l. This proves 1), which, together with lu∗ < lc,
proves 2). Similarly, 3) follows from 2) and the fact that wu = R′(l). Finally, 4) follows from
1) - 3), as R(lu(l)) − lu(l)wu(l) = R(l) − lR′(l) for l < lu∗, which is increasing in l due to the
concavity of R, and R(lu(l))− lu(l)wu(l) = R(lu∗)− lu∗R′(lu∗) for l ≥ lu∗. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. If the firm offers a wage below w∗(l), workers form a union and
profits are ΠU (l) = R(lu(l))− wu(l)lu(l). If it offers w∗(l), and workers accept, profits are:
Π(l) = R(l)− l
(
lu(l)
l
wu(l) +
l − lu(l)
l
w − C(l)
l
)
= R(l)− lu(l)wu(l) + (l − lu(l))w + C(l)
Let lu∗ be defined as in lemma 1, so that R(lu(l))− lu(l)wu(l) is maximized at lu∗. Then, if
the firm chooses l = lu∗, the above inequalities imply Π(lu∗) > R(lu∗)− lu∗wu(lu∗) = ΠU (lu∗) ≥
ΠU (l), for any l. It follows that for the optimal choice of l, l∗, Π(l∗) ≥ Π(lu∗) > ΠU (l), for any
l. If lu∗ is not feasible (lu∗ > l0), then it is still true that ΠU (l0) ≥ ΠU (l), for any l < l0, so that
Π(l∗) ≥ Π(l0) > ΠU (l), for any l < l0. ¥
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Proof of Proposition 3. Proposition 2 implies that it is optimal for the firm to avoid orga-
nization, so that profits are given by R(l)− w(l)l, where
w(l) =
lu(l)
l
(
wu(l)− C(l)
l
)
+
l − lu(l)
l
(
w − C(l)
l
)
Now, for l < lu∗, lu(l) = l, so that w(l) = wu(l)− C(l)l , and profits are R(l)−wu(l)l+C(l) =
R(lu(l))−wu(l)lu(l)+C(l). But from lemma 1 we know that R(lu(l))−wu(l)lu(l) is increasing
in l for l < lu∗. If C(l) is nondecreasing that implies that l∗ ≥ lu∗.
For l > lu∗, lu(l) = lu∗, and wu(l) = wu∗, so that (w(l)l) = lu∗wu∗ + (l − lu∗)w − C(l).
Therefore Π′(l) = R′(l)− (w(l)l)′ = R′(l)− w + C ′(l). It follows that for l < lc, Π′(l) > 0, and
l∗ ≥ lc. Π′(lc) = 0 only if C ′(lc) = 0. If C ′(lc) > 0, then Π′(lc) > 0, so that l∗ > lc. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4. 1) At a separating equilibrium, ρ(w) = 1 for every w ∈ SH . Thus,
any w ∈ SH such that w < wuH − c cannot be optimal, as shown in Lemma 1. Similarly,
w > wuH − c cannot be optimal either, as it is always better to offer w− ε > wuH − c. Therefore,
it has to be the case that SH = {wuH − c}, and o (wuH − c) = 0, as if o (wuH − c) > 0, it would be
better to offer wuH − c+ ε, for ε > 0 small enough.
2) ∀ w < wuH−c, ρ (w)wuH+(1− ρ (w))wuL−c ≥ w. Otherwise wuH−c would not be optimal
for the H firm. In particular, if w ∈ SL, wuL − c ≥ w, o(w) > 0, and o(w)(vuH − wuH) + (1 −
o(w))(vH − w) ≤ vH − wuH + c, for the H firm not to imitate the L firm.
3) Now, given 1) and 2), for an L firm not to deviate and imitate an H firm, it has to be the
case that, for any w ∈ SL, o(w)(vuL − wuL) + (1 − o)(vL − w) ≥ vL − wuH + c. For w < wuL − c,
o(w) = 1, so that if w < wuL− c and w ∈ SL, it must be the case that vuL−wuL ≥ vL−wuH + c. If
w = wuL−c, workers may randomize, but if they do, the above inequality requires o(w) ≤ w
u
H−wuL
vL−vuL+c
for L firms not to imitate high-value ones. Note that, if vuL −wuL ≥ vL −wuH + c, then o(w) can
be 1 for w ∈ SL.
2), and 3) thus imply that, if workers play mixed strategies on the equilibrium path
wuH − wuL
vH − vuH + c+ wuH − wuL
≤ o(wuL − c) ≤
wuH − wuL
vL − vuL + c
,
which can hold only if Assumption (SC) holds.
Now, Assumption (SC) is also sufficient for the existence of separating equilibria, as we can
always find beliefs that support such equilibria. For example, if ρ (w) = 1 for all w < wH such
that w /∈ SL, then the above equilibrium can be supported, and part i. is proven.
Part ii. follows from 1), as no fully separating separating equilibrium can exist in which H
firms get organized with positive probability. ¥
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Proof of Proposition 5. First note that, at any pooling equilibrium, firms play pure strate-
gies. To see this, suppose that firms randomize between w and w′. For this to be the case, both
types of firms must be indifferent between playing w and w′:
o (w) (vuH − wuH) + (1− o (w)) (vH − w) =
o
(
w′
)
(vuH − wuH) +
(
1− o (w′)) (vH − w′) , (4)
and
o (w) (vuL − wuL) + (1− o (w)) (vL − w) =
o
(
w′
)
(vuL − wuL) +
(
1− o (w′)) (vL − w′) (5)
The previous two equations form a system of linear equations with o (w) and o (w′) as
unknowns. It can be easily checked that the two equations are linearly independent, so that the
system has a unique solution. Since o (w) = 1 and o (w′) = 1 is a solution of the system, there
are no other values of o (w) and o (w′) that satisfy (4) and (5).
Therefore, at any pooling equilibrium, both types of firms offer the same wage wp. From
lemma 2, we know that o(wp) < 1, so that wp ≥ qwuH + (1− q)wuL − c.
Now, for L firms not to trigger organization, we need
o (wp) (vuL − wuL) + (1− o (wp)) (vL − qwuH − (1− q)wuL + c) ≥ vuL − wuL,
or vL− vuL+ c ≥ q (wuH − wuL). That is, condition (1) must hold, which proves part 2. Note that
Assumption (Sorting) guarantees that, if L firms do not want to trigger organization, H firms
do not want to do it either.
1. Condition (1) thus guarantees that no firm wants to trigger certain organization. To
have an equilibrium with no organization we also need to ensure that there is no other prof-
itable deviation. Clearly, w > wp cannot be such a deviation. For w < wp not to be
a profitable deviation, we need o (w) > 0, i.e. w ≤ ρ (w)wuH + (1− ρ (w))wuL − c. Let
workers’ beliefs be given by ρ (w) = 1 for all w 6= wp. With these beliefs, no type would
want to deviate from wp. Note that these beliefs would support any equilibrium with wp ∈
[qwuH + (1− q)wuL − c,min {vL − vuL + wuL, wuH − c}]. If wp > vL − vuL + wuL, L firms would
rather trigger organization, and, if wp > wuH − c, H firms would deviate to wuH − c+ ε, for ε > 0
small enough. This proves part 1.i.
2. Now, for workers to play o (wp) ∈ (0, 1), wp = qwuH + (1− q)wuL − c. If H firms are not
to avoid organization with certainty,
o (wp) (vuH − wuH) + (1− o (wp)) (vH − qwuH − (1− q)wuL + c) ≥ vH − wuH + c,
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which can be rewritten as
(1− q) (wuH − wuL)
(1− q) (wuH − wuL)+ (vH − vuH + c) ≥ o (wp) (6)
Inequality (6) also guarantees that ΠH (wp) ≥ vuH −wuH , as it is always better for H firms to
avoid unionization with certainty than to face unionization with certainty, and, given Assump-
tion (Sorting), that ΠL (wp) ≥ vL − wuH + c.
Condition (1) guarantees that no firm wants to trigger certain organization, and (6) that
they do not want to deviate to wuH − c either (and they are consistent). Therefore, if workers’
beliefs are given by ρ (w) = 1 for all w 6= wp, any deviation involves either certain organization
or paying at least wuH − c. Thus, no firm wants to deviate from wp. ¥
Proof of corollary 1. Let pnH be the proportion of nonunion firms of type H, and uL the
proportion of L firms that are unionized, so that pnH =
q
q+(1−q)(1−uL) . Then, at a separating
equilibrium, WGs = wuL − (pnH(wuH − c) + (1− pnH)(wuL − c)) = c− pnH(wuH −wuL). At a pooling
equilibrium,WGp = (qwuH+(1−q)wuL)−(qwuH+(1−q)wuL−c) = c. It follows thatWGp ≥WGs,
and that WGs is decreasing in uL. Reductions in (wuH − wuL), and increases in (vH − vuH), and
(vL − vuL) lower ul (thus raising WGs) and make pooling equilibrium more likely. Therefore,
these changes increase WG. An increase in c has the same effect through uL and equilibrium
selection, and also increases WGs and WGp directly. ¥
Proof of lemma 3. The fact that R′H > R
′
L implies that there exists a pair (w
u, lu) on
the R′H curve such that w
u ≥ wuL(l), and lu > luL(l), so that lu(wu − w) > luL(l)(wuL(l) − w).
Therefore, since (luH(l), w
u
H(l)) is preferred to any other (w
u, lu) on R′H , l
u
H(l)(w
u
H(l) − w) ≥
lu(wu − w) > luL(l)(wuL(l)− w). ¥
Proof of corollary 2. Follows immediately from lemma 3. ¥
Proof of proposition 6. Let (wL, lL) = (wH , lH) = (wp, lp), such that:
RH(lp)− wplp ≥ RH(lH)− wH lH ,
RL(lp)− wplp ≥ RL(lM )− wH(lM )lM
RL(lp)− wplp ≥ RL(lu∗L )− wu∗L lu∗L ,
and suppose o(wp, lp) = 0,
Define le < lp by RH(lp)−wplp = RH(le)−wL(le)le, so that if l < le H prefers the equilibrium
play to (w(le), le) for any beliefs that workers may hold. Therefore, for the equilibrium to satisfy
the Intuitive Criterion, it has to be the case that if l < le, then q(wL(l), l) = 0. But, in this
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case:
RL(le)− wL(le)le − (RL(lp)− wplp) =
RL(le) +RH(lp)− wplp −RH(le)− (RL(lp)− wplp) =
(RH(lp)−RL(lp))− (RH(le)−RL(le)) > 0
Therefore, there exists a profitable deviation for L, and (wL, lL) = (wH , lH) = (wp, lp) cannot
be an equilibrium with o(wp, lp) = 0.
The same argument would apply for o(wp, lp) > 0, as it would still be the case that for le as
defined above, (wL(le − ²), l − ²) for ² > 0 small enough is a profitable deviation for L. Partly
revealing equilibria could be eliminated in the same way. ¥
Proof of proposition 7. Let (lH , wH) 6= (l∗H , w∗H) be H’s equilibrium play. Then, at any
fully separating equilibrium, either wH = wH(lH) or workers organize with positive probability.
Now, corollary 2 implies that RH(l∗H)−w(l∗H)l∗H ≥ RH(l∗H)−wH(l∗H)l∗H . Therefore, since l∗H is
the unique optimal l under perfect information, RH(l∗H)−wH(l∗H)l∗H > RH(luH(l))−wuH(l)luH(l),
and RH(l∗H) − wH(l∗H)l∗H > RH(l) − wH(l)l for all l. Choosing l∗H , w∗H + ², for ² ≥ 0 small
enough, is thus a profitable deviation, so that (lH , wH) cannot be H’s equilibrium play. The
same argument would apply if H randomized at the proposed equilibrium play. ¥
Proof of lemma 4. Existence of l follows from RH(0) = 0 and the continuity of RH and
wL(l). For l < lu∗L , R
′
H(l)−(wL(l)l)′ = R′H(l)−(R′L(l)+R′′L(l)−C ′(l)) > 0, given R′H(l) > R′L(l),
R′′L(l) ≤ 0, and C ′(l) ≥ 0. For l ∈ (lu∗L , l∗H), R′H(l)− (wL(l)l)′ = R′H(l)− (w − C ′(l)) > 0, since
for l < l∗H , R
′
H(l)− (w−C ′(l)) ≥ R′H(l)− (wH(l)l)′ > 0. Therefore, RH(l)−wL(l)l is increasing
for l < l∗H . ¥
Proof of proposition 8. Let lM ≡ argmaxlRL(l) − wH(l)l. Then necessary conditions for
the existence of a fully separating equilibrium are:
RH(lH)− wH(lH)lH ≥ o(wL, lL)(RH(luH(lL))− wuH(lL)luH(lL))
+ (1− o(wL, lL))(RH(lL)− wLlL) (7)
o(wL, lL)(RL(luL(lL))− wuL(lL)luL(lL)) + (1− o(wL, lL))(RL(lL)− wLlL) ≥
RL(lM )− wH(lM )lM (8)
o(wL, lL)(RL(luL(lL))− wuL(lL)luL(lL)) + (1− o(wL, lL))(RL(lL)− wLlL) ≥
RL(lu∗L )− wu∗L lu∗L (9)
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A condition similar to (9) is not required as it was already shown in proposition 7 that H
prefers no organization.
If l > l∗L then at any fully separating equilibrium, (wL, lL) = (w
∗
L, l
∗
L), and o(wL, lL) = 0. To
check existence, note that l ≥ l∗L guarantees that (7) holds, and optimality of l∗L guarantees that
both (8) and (9) hold as well. Lastly, the beliefs q(w, l) = 0 for l ≤ l, and q(w, l) = 1 for l > l
support the equilibrium, and satisfy the Intuitive Criterion. No other (wL, lL) can be played at
an equilibrium that survives the Intuitive Criterion, as this criterion ensures that q(w∗L, l
∗
L) = 0,
so that (w∗L, l
∗
L) would be a profitable deviation for L. ¥
Proof of proposition 9. i. Let l ≤ l∗L. First note that it has to be the case that
RL(lM )− wH(lM )lM ≤ R(l)− wL(l)l. (10)
(That is, it is not possible that H would like to imitate L, and L would like to imitate H at the
same time). To see this, assume instead that
RL(lM )− wH(lM )lM > RL(l)− wL(l)l. (11)
This implies that lM > l. Otherwise, by 4. in lemma 1, and the fact that wL(l) ≤ wH(l),
R(l)− wL(l)l > R(lM )− wL(lM )lM >
> R(lM )− wH(lM )lM .
Now, by definition,
RH(l)− wL(l)l > RH(lM )− wH(lM )lM ,
so that wL(l)l < RH(l)−(RH(lM )−wH(lM )lM ), which implies RH(l)−(RH(lM )−wH(lM )lM ) >
RL(l) − (RL(lM ) − wH(lM )lM ). Or, rearranging RH(l) − RH(lM ) > RL(l) − RL(lM ), but this
is possible only if lM < l, which contradicts lM > l. Therefore (11) cannot hold.
Let
RL(l)− wL(l)l ≥ RL(lu∗L )− wu∗L lu∗L .
Then, there exist fully separating equilibria that survive the Intuitive Criterion such that
(wL, lL) =
(
wL(l), l
)
, and o
(
wL(l), l
)
= 0. To see this note that (7) holds by definition of
l, and (10) guarantees that (8) also holds. The same beliefs as in the previous proof would
support the equilibrium. Note that in this case, there exist no other equilibria with zero proba-
bility of organization, as any equilibrium with lL < l would not survive the Intuitive Criterion,
and if (wL, lL) = (wL(l), l) for l > l, (7) would not hold.
ii. Equilibria with positive probability of organization can exist for l ≥ l (if l < l they
would not survive the Intuitive Criterion). To see this, notice that if RL(lM ) − wH(lM )lM <
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RL(l)−wL(l)l, and RL(lu∗L )−wu∗L lu∗L < RL(l)−wL(l)l, then it is possible to find an lL = l+ ²,
with ² > 0, and an o > 0 such that H prefers (w∗H , l
∗
H) to (wL(lL), lL) if o(wL(lL), lL) = o, and
L still prefers (wL(lL), lL) to imitating H or becoming organized with certainty. To guarantee
that (7) holds, it is enough to set
o =
(RH(l + ²)− wL(l + ²)(l + ²))− (RH(l)− wL(l)l)
(RH(l + ²)− wL(l + ²)(l + ²))− (RH(luH(l + ²))− wuH(l + ²)luH(l + ²))
For ² small enough, (8) and (9) will still hold. ¥
Proof of proposition 10. Let (wL, lL) = (wL(l) − t, l), for some t > 0, and let q(w, l) = 1
for l > l, and q(w, l) = 0 for l ≤ l. These beliefs satisfy the Intuitive Criterion, and, given
the beliefs, L firms behave optimally (as it was shown above that if l < l∗L, RL(l) − wL(l)l ≥
RL(lM )− wH(lM )lM ).
Note also that no equilibrium exists at which organization is avoided with certainty, as
any such equilibrium would require lL > l, in which case, H firms would want to imitate L
firms, so that H’s incentive compatibility constraint would not hold. There can also exist
fully separating equilibria with o(wL, lL) ∈ (0, 1). Let l < l∗L be defined by RL(l) − wL(l)l =
RL(lu∗L ) − wu∗L lu∗L , so that l > l, and let lL = l, and wL = wL(l). Then, if o(wL, lL) ≥
RH(l)−wL(l)l−(RH(lH)−wH lH)
RH(l)−wL(l)l−(RH(luH(l))−wuH(l)luH(l)) , (7) will hold. On the other hand, since RL(l) − wL(l)l =
RL(lu∗L ) − wu∗L lu∗L , L cannot do better by triggering certain organization. Monotonicity, and
the facts that l∗L > l > l, and RL(l) − wL(l)l ≥ RL(lM ) − wH(lM )lM guarantee that (8) also
holds. Mixed strategy equilibria are also possible for l > l. However, these equilibria involve
nonmonotonic beliefs, as they require q(wL, lL) = 0 and q(wL(l), l) > 0 for l ∈ [l, lL). ¥
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